The Bank of England’s fees regime for financial market infrastructure supervision for CCPs and CSDs 2026/27 | Bank of England

The Bank of England’s fees regime for financial market infrastructure supervision for CCPs and CSDs 2026/27 | Bank of England Our use of cookies We use necessary cookies to make our site work. We’d also like to use some non-essential cookies (including third-party cookies) to help us improve the site. By clicking ‘Accept recommended settings’ on this banner, you accept our use of analytics cookies. For more information on how these cookies work please see our Cookie policy . Accept recommended cookies Proceed with necessary cookies only Skip to main content The Bank of England’s fees regime for financial market infrastructure supervision for CCPs and CSDs 2026/27 Policy statement Related links Related links Financial market infrastructure supervision The Bank of England's fees regime for financial market infrastructure supervision 2026/27 Published on 08 July 2026 Responses to consultation on fees regime for financial market infrastructure supervision 2026/27, fee rates for the 2026/27 fee year and policy statement. (Updating 2025/26 FMI Fees Policy Statement: 19 February 2026). 2026/27: Bank of England (BoE) Fees and Levies Under the Bank of England Act 1998, the Bank’s Court is responsible for setting the Bank’s strategy and approving its medium-term spending plans within a financial framework. Almost all (c.97%) of the Bank’s operational costs are recovered through levies and fees. These include the BoE Levy, PRA Levy, FMI Levy and Other (eg, management fees for Banknotes and the RTGS tariff). The remaining 3% is funded through customer banking charges. In this way, the costs of running the Bank are allocated to different groups of levy/fee payers in proportion to the costs we incur in fulfilling our various statutory objectives. The Bank’s costs are subject to tight control and are budgeted within constraints set by Court. Overall, the Bank’s operating budget, and the core levies financing it, are constrained to increase by no more than CPI in 2026/27. The Bank’s operating costs and the associated core levies which pay for it are set to rise by 3% in 2026/27 compared with 2025/26. Within this 3% constraint, individual levies will move up or down relative to each other as the Bank balances strategic operational investment priorities and the costs of running the Bank’s day-to-day operations. 2025/26 2026/27 Actuals (£ million) Budget (£ million) Budget (£ million) BoE Levy (operational policy cost component) 333 328 353 2025/26: Actuals broadly flat to Budget 2026/27: Budgeted costs grow year-on-year by 8% due to the Investment portfolio mix PRA Levy 350 350 345 2025/26: Actuals flat to Budget 2026/27: Budgeted costs reduce year-on-year by 1% due to Investment portfolio mix FMI Levy 18 17 18 2025/26: Actuals broadly flat to Budget 2026/27: Budgeted costs grow year-on-year by 3% Bank’s Core Levies (constrained within CPI) 701 695 715 2025/26: Actuals broadly flat to Budget 2026/27: Budgeted costs grow year-on-year by £20 million, 3%, within the CPI growth constraint Cost of Transition: adjustment to the Bank of England Levy related to the transition away from the legacy CRD funding model In addition to funding part of the Bank’s operational costs, the Bank of England levy contains an adjustment reflecting the transition away from the old Cash Ratio Deposit (CRD) scheme, as described in the 2024 BoE Levy Framework Document . Under the old CRD scheme, financial institutions were required to hold non-interest-bearing deposits at the Bank of England. These deposits were reinvested in gilts, and the income from the gilts was used to fund the Bank’s policy functions. Now that the Bank is instead more stably and directly funded via the levies, there is no need for such non-interest bearing deposits and they were converted into central bank reserves, remunerated at Bank Rate, in March 2024. The corresponding legacy CRD gilt portfolio was transferred to the Banking Department balance sheet at the same time. At that time, a transitional adjustment mechanism was agreed to ensure that the Bank’s funding was no longer affected by year-to-year movements in market interest rates. Specifically, when Bank Rate exceeds the investment return on the corresponding legacy CRD gilt portfolio, the financial system is required to return the ‘excess’ interest the Bank pays out on remunerated reserves to the Bank via a ‘Cost of Transition’ adjustment to supplement the Bank of England Levy. Conversely, when Bank Rate is below the investment return on the legacy CRD gilt portfolio, the Bank would use the return it makes on the gilts in excess of the interest it pays out on the corresponding remunerated reserves to reduce the Bank of England levy. This transitional arrangement has no impact on, and is unrelated to, the Bank’s operating costs. Its purpose is solely to ensure that movements in market interest rates do not affect the Bank’s funding or P&L. Because Bank Rate, and market-derived expectations of it, have risen, the remuneration paid out by the Bank on the reserves associated with the old CRD scheme is forecast to exceed the income generated by the Bank from the corresponding legacy CRD gilt portfolio. To offset this, the Cost of Transition to the Bank of England Levy in 2026/27 is £307 million related to expected interest differentials over the course of 2026/27. There is a prior year adjustment of £40 million of which £36 million relates to the actual Bank Rate differential over 2025/26 relative to the forward OIS curve that was used to project it, and £4 million related to under recovery of actual Operational Policy Costs in 2025/26. The Bank of England Levy is set at £700 million for 2026/27 and reflects the transition away from the legacy CRD scheme. The Cost of Transition for 2026/27 represents the excess interest paid by the Bank to Industry on remunerated reserves created through the gross Cost of Transition to the BoE Levy (£874 million), less income earned by the Bank on the legacy gilt portfolio (£258 million) and the Cost of Transition which was collected in 2025/26 (£273 million). The resulting £343 million is therefore the net amount the Bank is recovering from Industry through the Bank of England Levy, separate from £357 million of operational policy costs. Anticipated in 26/27 (£ million) + Prior year adjustment (£ million) = 26/27 Budget (£ million) Cost of transition Interest paid by the Bank to Industry on remunerated reserves 431 444 874 Income received by the Bank on legacy CRD gilt portfolio (124) (135) (258) Cost of Transition collected by the Bank from Industry in 2025/26 – (273) (273) Costs of Transition (net) 307 36 343 Operational Policy Costs 353 4 357 Total Bank of England Levy 660 40 700 The full set of levies for 2026/27, along with a comparison with those of 2025/26 is shown below. Budget 2026/27 (£ million) 2025/26 (£ million) Movement (£ million) ( a ) Movement (per cent) ( a ) BoE Levy 700 596 104 17 of which: Operational Policy Cost 353 328 24 8 Cost of Transition from CRD 307 271 36 N/A ( b ) Prior year adjustment for under recovery 40 -3 43 N/A ( b ) PRA Levy 345 350 -5 -1 FMI Levy 18 17 0 3 Other Fees 226 219 7 3 Total Levies and Fees 1,289 1,183 106 9 BoE Levy Cost of Transition and prior year adjustments and other levies outside of CPI constraint -574 -487 -86 Total Core Levies, constrained within CPI 715 695 20 3 Footnotes (a) Increase reflects recovery of excess interest paid by the Bank to Industry in the prior year 2025/26 based on the estimated Interest Rate trajectory for 2026/27 as at May 2026. (b) Not meaningful in percentage terms. Overview This Bank of England (the Bank) policy statement (PS) provides feedback to responses to the consultation paper (CP), The Bank of England's fees regime for financial market infrastructure supervision 2026/27 . The PS also confirms: The fee rates to meet the Bank’s 2026/27 funding requirement for its financial market infrastructure (FMI) central counterparties (CCPs) and central securities depositories (CSDs) supervisory activity and the policy activity that supports this, as permitted by the Bank’s fee-levying powers. An extension to the phased recovery period for UK CCP rulebook costs. This PS is relevant to all FMIs (apart from recognised payment systems and specified service providers) that currently pay FMI supervisory fees to the Bank or are expecting to do so within the 2026/27 fee year. footnote [1] This includes both UK and non-UK FMIs. We previously signposted that HM Treasury (HMT) is exploring options to increase the statutory fee cap for recognised payment systems and specified service providers, by regulations subject to Parliamentary approval, and will consult on any proposals in due course. The Bank will therefore consult separately on the annual supervision fee for recognised payment systems and specified service providers for the 2026/27 fee year once the HMT consultation is under way. The Bank expects to begin levying supervision fees for the Digital Securities Sandbox (DSS) in the 2026/27 fee year. Supervision fees for the DSS were addressed in a policy statement published on 30 September 2024 and are included in this document for information. Feedback to responses The Bank’s public consultation on the fees regime for FMI supervision 2026/27 ran from 17 April until 18 May 2026. The Bank received five responses footnote [2] to the consultation. Having carefully considered these responses, the Bank is adopting the proposals as set out in the CP. Details regarding the consultation feedback and the Bank’s responses to the feedback can be found below. Implementation Invoices are expected to be issued before the end of August for the 2026/27 fee year. Bank response to consultation feedback received The Bank received five responses to the consultation, and the main points raised have been grouped under the following headings. Timing of the consultation Respondents fed back positively on the revised and earlier timing of the consultation which enables them to reflect the costs in their annual budget and planning cycles. Respondents, however, questioned why there remained uncertainty in costs at the consultation stage given the caveat around the Bank pension costs referenced in the CP. This is a necessary feature of issuing the CP at a much earlier point in the year meaning the CP relies on estimates rather than finalised Bank pension costs. The approach to consulting ahead of the finalised Bank pension costs is the same approach that the Prudential Regulation Authority has used for some time for its consultation process. This year the pension cost outcome is in line with that included in the CP so the fees on which the Bank consulted have not been impacted on this occasion. Firms also questioned when invoices would be issued. As detailed in the CP, we expect to issue invoices for the 2026/27 fee year before the end of August 2026. Given that we have transitioned the timeline this year we welcome bilateral engagement with any firms who require flexibility in making payment against this timeline. Policy costs Respondents questioned the Bank’s approach to charging firms for policy and research costs. The Bank is able, under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), footnote [3] to require recognised clearing houses, third-country central counterparties, recognised CSDs or settlement internalisers to pay fees to the Bank which were incurred ‘in connection with the discharge of any of its qualifying functions’. The qualifying functions of the Bank include those exercised under, or as a result, of Part 18 of FSMA , the UK European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and the Central Securities Depositories Regulation (CSDR). Consistent with this framework, the costs that may be recovered are not limited to those incurred by supervisory activities. They also include policy work that is carried out in direct support of the Bank discharging those supervisory functions. The Bank’s approach to fees, is set out in the consolidated FMI fees policy statement, The Bank of England’s fees regime for UK financial market infrastructures . This explains that the Bank will levy fees for both its FMI supervisory activity and the policy work that supports it, in line with its fee‑levying powers. These fees cover the costs of FMI supervision, together with associated policy support, specialist resources, corporate services, and other costs incurred by the Financial Market Infrastructure Directorate (FMID). Proportionality Respondents expressed concern that the costs of supervising CCPs are greater than that for other FMI types. The nature of the Bank’s supervisory activity and regulatory regimes, and hence its costs, vary across the different FMI types, and the categories of firms within them. For example, in contrast to other FMI types, CCPs centralise and manage significant financial risk. Regulations require regulatory approval for material changes to how those risks are managed. These different levels of activity are therefore reflected in the different fees applied to each FMI type. The Bank of England’s supervision of financial market infrastructures Annual Report 26 June 2025 – 28 February 2026 and The Bank of England’s approach to financial market infrastructure supervision provide more detail on the nature of the work undertaken on the different FMI types. As noted in the 2026/27 consultation, HMT is exploring options to increase the statutory fee cap for payment systems and will consult on any proposals in due course. The trajectory and scale of FMI fees Respondents welcomed the reduction in UK CCP fees but questioned why this was not more given the efficiencies that the Bank is making. Respondents also expressed concerns over the uncertain trajectory for fees and the overall scale of fees when compared to other jurisdictions, uncertainty about what was influencing fees, and requested an extension to the phased recovery period for UK CCP rulebook costs. The Bank of England regulates and supervises FMIs to safeguard financial stability by ensuring that these important systems remain financially and operationally resilient. Given the central role of UK FMIs in the financial system domestically and globally, avoiding disruption to their critical services provides the basis for sustained economic growth. The work to create a UK CCP rulebook is nearing completion with costs expected to be contained within the revised forecast of £5,000,000 which we shared previously. The original forecast was for £4,500,000 with a plan to recover in instalments of £1,500,000 over three years. We intend keeping the 2026/27 cost recovery instalment at £1,500,000 and recovering any excess over the original forecast in the 2027/28 fee year. We welcome bilateral engagement with any firms that require flexibility through an extension to the recovery period. Respondents were interested in understanding what work was involved in developing the rulebook. Key activities include publishing CPs, including draft rules and a cost benefit analysis in respect of CCPs; seeking a wide range of feedback from industry and other authorities and analysing responses to the consultation; completing statutory governance processes, including FMI Committee; and publishing policy statements and final rules. We are normalising our ongoing CCP policy work since the establishment of FSMA 2023 and expect these costs to reach a settled state in the near term – in addition the work on the UK CCP rulebook has almost been completed. Beyond CCP rulebook development, our workplan for 2026/27 as set out in the FMI Annual Report 2025–26 included work to enhance resilience and support innovation. As regards other policy work, the Bank is scoping what a future CSD settlement regime could look like, including which activities and instruments should be required to settle in CSDs. The Bank is considering as part of this work the development of new settlement models and considering what is needed to achieve a proportionate regime that ensures consistent treatment across tokenised and non-tokenised settlement. The Bank monitors its overall budget closely. How we allocate our work within that budget is subject to annual prioritisation and the forward look for how we will deliver our statutory objectives is set out in the FMI Annual Report. FMID continues to prioritise cost efficiency, supported by organisation‑wide efficiency measures. FMI fees charged in the UK are not always directly comparable to those charged in other jurisdictions because of differences in funding models, supervisory scope and regulatory architecture. The statutory approach to fees sits outside the scope of this consultation and is governed by HMT. New FMIs Respondents expressed concern that new entrants should not be subsidised by incumbent firms against whom some of them may seek to compete. The Bank’s aim is to help support new entrants and so support responsible innovation. This is achieved by establishing a supervisory approach for new firms that reflects the risks to financial stability that they might pose, with the work that we do on different types and categories of firm tailored accordingly as set out in our recent publication. footnote [4] New firms are not automatically placed into a lower category on entry. FMI supervisory fee ratios and fees for 2026/27 The ratios for allocating fees between the different categories of FMIs for 2026/27 are confirmed in Table A. Table A: Fee ratio across UK FMI categories for 2026/27 fee year ( a ) FMI types and categories Fee ratios by category 1:2:3 Central counterparties 1.75 : 1.00 : 0.33 Central securities depository 1.75 : 1.00 : 0.33 Footnotes (a) The FMI categories are described as follows: category 1 – most significant systems which have the capacity to cause very significant disruption to the financial system by failing or by the manner in which they carry out their business; category 2 – significant systems which have the capacity to cause some disruption to the financial system by failing or by the manner in which they carry out their business; and category 3 – systems which have the capacity to cause at most minor disruption to the financial system by failing or by the manner in which they carry out their business. Table B sets out the expected charge for each category of FMI for the 2026/27 fee year. Table B: Fees for 2026/27 fee year ( a ) Category Cost CCPs CSD Category 1 General fees £3.34 million £1.80 million Rulebook development instalment £0.58 million Total £3.92 million Category 2 General fees £1.91 million n.a. Rulebook development instalment £0.33 million Total £2.24 million Category 3 General fees £0.63 million n.a. Rulebook development instalment tbc ( b ) Total tbc Footnotes (a) These are rounded figures and FMIs within scope of the regime can expect to be billed exact amounts. (b) If a CCP is authorised during the year they will contribute towards the rulebook development costs incurred from the point of their authorisation. The ratio of fees charged and the fees applied is set out in Table C. Table C: Non-UK CCP fees for 2026/27 fee year Non-UK CCP group Fee ratio 2026/27 fee Group A 4.0 n.a. Group B 1.0 £149,070 Group C 0.3 £44,721 Group D Fixed fee £9,000 The fees for non-UK CSDs are set out in Table D. Table D: Non-UK CSD fees for 2026/27 fee year Non-UK CSD group 2026/27 fee Group A £119,000 Group B £6,000 (fixed fee) Under or overspend in fees for 2025/26 As set out in the June 2018 policy statement, the Bank will set FMI fees based on the expected business as usual supervisory resource expenditure for the upcoming fee year. Where the Bank’s spend is greater or less than anticipated, the Bank will consider adjusting its annual supervisory levy for the following fee year to account for any under or overspends. Following a final review of supervisory resource allocation in 2025/26, the Bank costs were in line with expectations and there will therefore be no recovery or rebate. The fee year for 2026/27 runs from 1 March 2026 to 28 February 2027. ICE Clear Europe (ICEU), the European Association of CCP Clearing Houses (EACH) and Euroclear UK & International (EUI) responded to the consultation and consented to their names being published. Other respondents asked that their response remained anonymous. Paragraph 36, schedule 17A of FSMA 2000 . The Bank of England’s supervisory approach to onboarding new financial market infrastructure firms . The Bank of England’s supervisory approach to onboarding new financial market infrastructure firms . Close Paragraph 36, schedule 17A of FSMA 2000 . Close ICE Clear Europe (ICEU), the European Association of CCP Clearing Houses (EACH) and Euroclear UK & International (EUI) responded to the consultation and consented to their names being published. Other respondents asked that their response remained anonymous. Close The fee year for 2026/27 runs from 1 March 2026 to 28 February 2027. Close Convert this page to PDF Other publications Publication // Policy statement 08 July 2026 The Bank of England’s fees regime for financial... 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