Treasury Targets Criminal Facilitators Behind CJNG’s Cross‑Border Fuel Smuggling Schemes | U.S. Department of the Treasury

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FREEDOM250 Countdown to America's 250th Anniversary July 4, 2026 Learn More Press Releases Treasury Targets Criminal Facilitators Behind CJNG’s Cross‑Border Fuel Smuggling Schemes June 30, 2026 Treasury Issues Alert on Cartel Fuel Smuggling and Tax Evasion Schemes on the U.S. Southern Border WASHINGTON —Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) announced multiple actions combatting fuel smuggling schemes linked to Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG), a violent drug cartel designated under both counternarcotics and counterterrorism authorities. OFAC has sanctioned two Mexican nationals and nine entities tied to a CJNG-linked fuel theft scheme—involving cross-border smuggling, falsified customs documents, and shell companies—to evade Mexican taxes while generating tens of millions of dollars annually for the cartel.  In addition, FinCEN issued a supplemental Alert providing additional guidance on financial typologies and red flags indicative of CJNG and other Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) smuggling fuel from the United States into Mexico in schemes involving Mexican tax evasion. "Today's action highlights the extent to which Mexico's cartels are expanding beyond traditional drug trafficking to generate revenue for their criminal organizations, which continue to traffic deadly drugs that kill Americans," said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . "Treasury's actions targeting these illicit revenue streams advance the Trump Administration's priority of dismantling these terrorist organizations and making America safe again." Today’s action reflects strong collaboration between OFAC and FinCEN, and was coordinated with a South Texas Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF)-led investigation involving the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI), Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), among others.  OFAC and FinCEN work in close coordination with the HSTFs, which target the proliferation of illicit drugs and the networks, enablers, and financial mechanisms that support their production and distribution.  Today’s sanctions were also developed jointly with the Government of Mexico’s financial intelligence unit, the Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (UIF). Among those designated is Oscar Guillermo Juraidini Silva , who supports CJNG in a fuel smuggling enterprise that generates hundreds of millions of dollars each year.  FinCEN’s Alert is one of several recent FinCEN advisory and analytic products on revenue streams and illicit activity associated with Mexico-based FTOs and other criminal organizations, to include the procurement of fentanyl precursor chemicals and fentanyl-related threat patterns and trends ; timeshare fraud ; human smuggling along the southwest border ; bulk cash smuggling ; Chinese money laundering networks and associated threat patterns and trends ; crude oil smuggling on the southwest border ; cross-border funds transfers involving illegal aliens ; human trafficking associated with the 2026 FIFA World Cup ; and non-work authorized populations and their employers and risks to the integrity of the U.S. financial system . CJNG: VIOLENT DRUG CARTEL AND FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION CJNG is a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO) and specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) that is responsible for a significant proportion of fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States.  On February 20, 2025 , the Department of State designated CJNG as an FTO and SDGT.  Treasury previously sanctioned CJNG on April 8, 2015 pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act and on December 15, 2021 pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059, which targets the international proliferation of illicit drugs and their means of production.  OFAC has taken numerous actions against CJNG-linked individuals and companies for enabling drug trafficking, money laundering, and corruption. In recent years, Mexico-based drug trafficking cartels like CJNG have become increasingly involved in the theft, adulteration, and smuggling of hydrocarbons, such as fuel and oil, in schemes colloquially referred to in Mexico as huachicol. These schemes have grown into powerful revenue generators for CJNG through the theft of tens of billions of dollars in lost revenue for the Mexican government and have enabled CJNG campaigns of narcotics trafficking in the United States, violence against Mexican government forces along the U.S. southwest border, and corruption within Mexico. Over the last two years, OFAC has taken a series of actions targeting cartel involvement in the illicit practice of huachicol , including on September 10, 2024 and on May 1, 2025 .  Similarly, FinCEN’s May 2025 Alert provided financial typologies and red flags indicative of crude oil smuggling schemes on the U.S. southwest border associated with CJNG and other Mexico-based TCOs.  In the 12-month period following this Alert, FinCEN received over 160 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) that detailed over $7 billion in suspicious activity, sent primarily between the United States and Mexico and often involving Mexican cartels, most commonly CJNG.  The most common U.S. states involved in the SARs are Texas and Florida.  In Texas, the subjects were mostly located in cities and towns near the U.S.–Mexico border, including Brownsville, Mission, Eagle Pass, and McAllen with most subjects involved in the oil and natural gas and transportation industries. CRUDE CRIMINALS AND BEYOND:  MEXICAN NORTHBOUND OIL SMUGGLING AND SOUTHBOUND FUEL SMUGGLING Huachicol -related activities are currently the most significant non-drug revenue source for Mexican cartels and other illicit actors. Huachicol -related activities generally encompass (1) fuel and oil theft in Mexico, (2) the smuggling of crude oil into the United States, and (3) the smuggling of fuel from the United States into Mexico involving Mexican tax evasion schemes known as fiscal fuel theft ( huachicol fiscal ). Thieves in Mexico (known as huachicoleros ) use a variety of means to steal fuel and crude oil from Mexico’s state-owned energy company, Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), including bribing corrupt Pemex employees, illegally drilling taps into pipelines, stealing from refineries, hijacking tanker trucks, and threatening Pemex employees.  Fuel stolen from Pemex is sold on the black market around Mexico.  As highlighted in FinCEN’s May 2025 Alert, stolen crude oil is smuggled into the United States through complicit Mexican brokers and often mislabeled as “waste oil” or other hazardous material to avoid scrutiny and evade taxes and regulations.  The oil is then delivered to complicit U.S. importers in the oil and natural gas industry operating near the U.S. southwest border, who sell it at a steep discount on the U.S. and global energy markets before repatriating the significant illicit profits back to the cartels in Mexico. As FinCEN’s supplemental Alert highlights, fiscal fuel theft schemes involve Mexico-based cartels and their huachicoleros smuggling gasoline, diesel, naphtha, and other fuel from the United States across the southern border or U.S. ports into Mexico in schemes to evade Mexico’s import tax on fuel, known as Impuesto Especial sobre Producción y Servicios (IEPS). Through these schemes, the cartels use complicit Mexican trading companies ( comercializadoras ) with fuel distribution permits from Mexico’s National Energy Commission (Comisión Nacional de Energía) to purchase fuel from complicit U.S. fuel distribution companies and issue false invoices to legitimize and commercialize the illicit fuel in Mexico.  These brokers, however, lack the appropriate permits from Mexico’s Secretariat of Energy (Secretaría de Energía) to import fuel into Mexico.  As part of the scheme, complicit U.S. fuel distributors leverage their relationships with major U.S. refineries and fuel distributors to purchase and then divert fuel to interconnected networks of U.S. and Mexican front and shell companies in the freight, logistics, and other industries before it is smuggled into Mexico via tanker trucks, railcars, and shadow fleets of maritime vessels.  The Mexican cartels and their huachicoleros can evade the IEPS through various means, including misclassifying customs documentation, bribery of government officials, or other methods before transporting the fuel to storage yards under their control and then selling it within Mexico for a steep profit through cartel-controlled or affiliated gas stations and unregulated roadside fuel stops.  Public reporting suggests that a quarter to a third of all fuel sold in Mexico may be illicit. According to FinCEN’s analysis of Bank Secrecy Act reporting, the Mexican cartels primarily use the brokers and their access to the Mexican financial system to send international wire transfers and digital asset payments to the complicit U.S. fuel distribution companies for the smuggled fuel — either directly or through shell companies acting as pass-through accounts.  In other cases, the cartels may pay the complicit U.S. fuel distributors directly through structured cash deposits into their bank accounts with illicit proceeds from drug trafficking and other criminal activities in the United States as a form of trade-based money laundering.  The complicit U.S. fuel distributors obfuscate these ill-gotten fuel sales through a variety of money laundering typologies including purchases of (i) luxury goods such as high-end vehicles, high-value jewelry or exclusive vacation rentals/travel destinations; (ii) real estate; and (iii) investment assets.  In Mexico, the cartels use their illicit profits from the black market fuel sales to make cash payments to Mexican political campaigns and media outlets to help elect corrupt Mexican politicians willing to assist the cartels control key administrative positions in the government, which facilitates fuel smuggling operations and access to state contracts to launder the illicit profits from these schemes and other criminal activities. FRACTURING CJNG’S FUEL FACILITATORS Building upon OFAC’s prior actions, today OFAC designated Oscar Guillermo Juraidini Silva ( Juraidini ), who is a key business person facilitating CJNG’s fuel theft enterprise.  Juraidini operates as an accountant and the mastermind behind certain financial operations for CJNG.  Juraidinicreates and operates shell companies on behalf of CJNG, and falsifies customs documents for CJNG to aid in the illicit cross-border transfer of fuel.  Juraidini imports fuel from the United States into Mexico that is intentionally mislabeled in customs documentation to circumvent Mexican IEPS taxes.  The majority of Juraidini’s clients are gas station companies, which receive the refined fuel products and sell them via retail gas stations. Juraidini generates tens of millions of dollars annually, benefiting CJNG. Juraidini owns six businesses in Mexico, operating in transportation, financial services, and real estate sectors.  Juraidini’s Mexican companies include: Centro Cambiario La Peseta, S.A. de C.V. ; OJ Living Trust, S.A.P.I. de C.V. ; RK Real King, S.A. de C.V. ; Soma Transporte y Servicios, S.A. de C.V. ; Ogui Fletes ; and OF Transportes .  In addition, Juraidini owns a business based in the United Kingdom, Cucumber Sweet Waves Ltd . OFAC designated Oscar Guillermo Juraidini Silva pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, CJNG.  Additionally, OFAC designated the companies Centro Cambiario La Peseta, S.A. de C.V.; OJ Living Trust, S.A.P.I. de C.V.; RK Real King, S.A. de C.V.; Soma Transporte y Servicios, S.A. de C.V.; Ogui Fletes; OF Transportes; and Cucumber Sweet Waves Ltd pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Oscar Guillermo Juraidini Silva. Today, OFAC also designated J. Refugio Ruiz Villagomez , who plays a role in Jomadi Logistics & Cargo, S.A. de C.V. ( Jomadi ) and Ahavat Logistics Solution, S.A. de C.V. ( Ahavat ). J. Refugio Ruiz Villagomez has knowingly smuggled fuel from the United States into Mexico without proper permits.  He pays fees to cartels and other criminal organizations that control ports of entry between the United States and Mexico.  According to investigative findings made public by Mexico’s Attorney General’s office, Jomadi is an import and export company involved in huachicol fiscal .  Jomadi and Ahavat have transacted through the U.S. financial system to the tune of tens of millions of dollars with third parties linked to CJNG that have been involved in huachicol -related activities. OFAC designated Jomadi Logistics & Cargo, S.A. de C.V. and Ahavat Logistics Solution, S.A. de C.V. pursuant to E.O. 14059 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, CJNG.  Additionally, OFAC designated Jomadi Logistics & Cargo, S.A. de C.V. and Ahavat Logistics Solution, S.A. de C.V. pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, CJNG.  OFAC also designated J. Refugio Ruiz Villagomez pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Jomadi Logistics & Cargo, S.A. de C.V. and Ahavat Logistics Solution, S.A. de C.V. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.  Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons.  OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions.  In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons.  The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.  Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions.  Individuals located in the United States or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions.  OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law.  The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.  For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . Click here to view a chart on the persons designated today . 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